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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mario Ruiz appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon the jury 
verdict finding him guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine. Specifically, Ruiz 
challenges the district court's ruling that limited Ruiz's cross-examination of a 
state's witness. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedincls 
1 Ruiz sold methamphetamine to Josh Morrison. ( T .  p.66, L.23 - p.68, 
L.13;p.99,L.17-p.l00, L.3;p.153, L.13-p.157,L.18.) Morrison,inturn,sold 
the methamphetamine to a confidential informant, Megan Larson. ( T .  p.23, 
Ls.15-23; p.68, Ls.14-20; p.99, L.17 - p.100, L.3; p.129, Ls.4-15; p.130, Ls.9-14; 
p.139, Ls.22-24; p.146, Ls.23-25; p.157, Ls.20-25; p.170, Ls.19-20.) The state 
charged Morrison and Ruiz with trafficking in methamphetamine. (R., pp.16-19.) 
Ruiz pled not guilty. (R., p.23.) At Ruiz's jury trial, Morrison and Larson testified 
against Ruiz. (Tr., pp.59-102; 146-159; 169-177.) The jury found Ruiz guilty of 
trafficking in methamphetamine. (R., pp.38-39; Tr., p.211, L.25 - p.212, L.16.) 
The district court entered judgment and sentenced Ruiz to a unified term of ten 
years with three years fixed. (R., pp.57-61; Tr., p.228, L.18 - p.229, L.2.) Ruiz 
timely appealed. (R., pp.62-65; 71-74.) 
' The record contains two transcripts, one including jury selection and opening arguments and 
another that transcribes the rest of the trial and Ruiz's sentencing hearing. The state will only cite 
to the transcript containing the main portion of the trial and the sentencing hearing. That 
transcript will be referenced herein as "Tr." 
1 
Ruiz states the issues on appeal as: 
Did the district court commit reversible error in limiting Mr. Ruiz's 
cross-examination of a key prosecution witness? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Ruiz failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it ruled 
that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of 
evidence that Ruiz faced a mandatory minimum sentence of three years while a 
state's witness, Morrison, avoided the mandatory minimum because of his plea 
agreement with the state? 
ARGUMENT 
Ruiz Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It 
Ruled That The Danqer Of Unfair Preiudice Substantiallv Outweiahed The 
Probative Value Of Evidence That Ruiz Faced A Mandatory Minimum Sentence 
Of Three Years While A State's Witness, Morrison, Avoided The Mandatory 
Minimum Because Of His Plea Aareement With The State 
A. Introduction 
Ruiz asserts that the district court committed reversible error when it held 
that cross-examination of a state's witness, Morrison, regarding mandatory 
minimum sentences applicable to trafficking in methamphetamine was 
inadmissible. (Appellant's brief, p.6.) Specifically, Ruiz argues that the limitation 
on cross-examination violated his "Constitutional right to confrontation, as well as 
ldaho Rules of Evidence 401 and 403." (Appellant's brief, p.8.) Ruiz's claims 
fail. The record demonstrates that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
under applicable evidentiary standards when it limited the cross-examination of 
Morrison. 
B. Standard of Review 
Whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse 
witnesses was violated is a question of law over which appellate courts exercise 
free review. State v. Hooper, 145 ldaho 139, ---, 176 P.3d 911, 914 (2007). The 
trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its judgment will 
be reversed only when there has been an abuse of that discretion. State v. 
Howard, 135 ldaho 727, 731-32, 24 P.3d 44, 48-49 (2001); State v. Zimmerman, 
121 ldaho 971, 974, 829 P.2d 861 (1992). 
C. The Record Demonstrates That The District Court Pro~erlv Exercised Its 
Discretion When It Limited The Cross-Examination Of Morrison 
"The control of cross-examination of a witness is committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial judge, and absent a showing of prejudice, a limitation of 
cross-examination imposed by a trial judge will not be overturned on appeal." 
State v. Marek, 112 ldaho 860, 867, 736 P.2d 1314, 1321 (1987) (citing State v. 
Pierce, 107 ldaho 96, 685 P.2d 837 (Ct. App. 1984)). See also, State v. Brown, 
109 ldaho 981, 984-95, 712 P.2d 682, 685-86 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Wheeler, 
109 ldaho 795, 798, 711 P.2d 741, 745 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Brazzell, 118 
Idaho 431, 436, 797 P.2d 139, 144 (Ct. App. 1990). "The jury's function . . . is to 
determine guilt or innocence, regardless of penalty." Pierce, 107 ldaho 96, 104- 
105, 685 P.2d 837, 845-846 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing State v. Altwatter, 29 ldaho 
107, 157 P. 256 (1916)). Ruiz has failed to show that the district court abused its 
discretion by ruling that evidence of the penalties Ruiz might face if convicted 
was inadmissible. 
The state charged both Ruiz and Morrison with trafficking in 
methamphetamine. (R., pp.16-19.) Morrison testified on direct and cross- 
examination that his testimony was provided as part of a plea bargain pursuant to 
which the state reduced his trafficking charge to delivery of a controlled 
substance. (Tr., p.60, Ls.25; p.72, Ls.9-14; p.79, L.13 - p.80, L.7.) Morrison 
also testified on direct examination that, as part of the plea agreement, the state 
would recommend probation and jail time. (Tr., p.61, Ls.1-3.) During Morrison's 
cross-examination, the state moved to preclude Ruiz from questioning Morrison 
about the mandatory minimum sentence for trafficking, three years in prison, that 
was no longer applicable to Morrison because of the plea agreement. (Tr., p.74, 
The state contended this testimony was inadmissible. (Tr., p.74, Ls.15- 
17.) Ruiz objected to any limitation of his cross-examination of Morrison about 
this aspect of the plea agreement because "[the state] opened the door regarding 
probation in this case. And if [the jury is] going to take that into consideration, 
[the jury has] got to know what this guy is facing." (Tr., p.74, Ls.18-22.) The 
court noted that while Ruiz had the right to challenge Morrison's credibility, "the 
jury is not to be advised of the penalties that the defendant might face, if 
convicted." (Tr., p.76, Ls.21-23.) 
The court stated: 
You can . . . make an inquiry with regard to the maximum 
sentence that he could receive. You can make an inquiry with 
regard to the fact that he is receiving a recommendation from the 
State [for] a significantly lesser sentence. 
I will not let you get into the fact that this defendant faces a 
minimum mandatory sentence of three years. I think the fact that 
[Morrison] has cut a deal in which the State is going to recommend 
a far less than a life sentence makes the point without having to 
get into minimum mandatories. 
(Tr., p.75, L.5-p.76, L.1.) 
After this ruling, Ruiz went on to further cross-examine Morrison as 
follows: 
[Ruiz]: [I]n that deal that for exchange for your testimony 
today that you would receive -- your charges would be reduced 
from trafficking in methamphetamine to delivery of a controlled 
substance. Right? 
[Morrison]: Yes 
[Ruiz]: Okay. And in the sentence recommendation that the 
State will hold themselves to generally will be that you will be put 
on probation. Correct? 
[Morrison]: Yes. 
[Ruiz]: And pursuant to probation, you will serve some jail 
time. Correct? 
[Morrison]: To my knowledge, yes. 
[Ruiz]: Yeah. But you don't know how much jail time? 
[Morrison]: No. 
[Ruiz]: But you know it is going to be some jail time? 
[Morrison]: Yeah. 
[Ruiz]: And that will all be argued at your sentencing. 
Correct? 
[Morrison]: Yes. 
[Ruiz]: And that you haven't pled yet. Correct? 
[Morrison]: No, I have not. 
[Ruiz]: They are waiting for your testimony today. Right? 
[Morrison]: Yes 
[Ruiz]: And that basically you have escaped, by those 
reduction of charges, you have escaped a prison sentence. 
Correct? 
[Morrison]: I would hardly call it escape. I am still facing 
consequences for my poor choices. 
[Ruiz]: Right. But you're going to be put on probation? 
[Morrison]: Yeah 
(Tr., p.79, L.13-p.81, L.10.) 
On appeal, Ruiz argues that because he "was not allowed to ask Mr. 
Morrison the critical questions that would have allowed the jury to understand 
why delivery of methamphetamine was considered a 'lesser' charge, to 
comprehend just how significant it is for a defendant to have his charge reduced 
. . . and, to ultimately, appreciate the tremendous incentive for Mr. Morrison" to 
testify against Ruiz, the district court denied Ruiz's Sixth Amendment 
confrontation right. (Appellant's brief, p.13 (emphasis in original).) Ruiz also 
argues that in limiting Morrison's cross-examination, the district court abused its 
discretion in the application of ldaho Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403 by 
excluding relevant evidence with probative value that "was 'substantially 
outweighed' by any countervailing interests identified in Rule 403." (Appellant's 
brief, p.18-19.) 
"The court's discretion should be exercised to allow a criminal defendant 
considerable latitude in cross-examining witnesses; but a limitation imposed by 
the judge will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing of prejudice." 
m, 107 ldaho 96, 104, 685 P.2d 837, 846. Pierce presented a situation 
similar to Ruiz's case. In that case, Pierce argued that "the district court 
erroneously prevented him from cross-examining [a witness] about a plea 
bargain he made with the state." 107 ldaho at 104, 685 P.2d at 845. The trial 
judge in Pierce would not allow cross-examination of a witness about the 
maximum penalties for crimes that included the crime for which Pierce was on 
trial. Id. The ldaho Court of Appeals held that: 
Because the jury was informed of the plea bargain, because 
Pierce was allowed to inquire substantially into the nature of that 
plea bargain, and because [the witness] had not yet actually been 
sentenced . . . the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by merely 
restricting further inquiry into comparable penalties for different 
offenses. 
Id., 107 Idaho at 105, 685 P.2d at 846. -
Contrary to Ruiz's arguments, the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in limiting the cross-examination of Morrison, because the record demonstrates 
that the district court properly exercised its discretion. The jury in Ruiz's case 
heard testimony about Morrison's plea bargain during both the direct and cross- 
examination of him. The district court allowed Ruiz to cross-examine Morrison 
extensively about that plea bargain with the state-including the fact that 
Morrison would not face prison. Like the witness in Pierce, Morrison had not yet 
been sentenced when he testified at Ruiz's trial. The trial court allowed the jury 
to hear ample evidence demonstrating the potential biases and credibility issues 
inherent in Morrison's testimony As a result, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion, and Ruiz was not prejudiced, by limiting the cross-examination of 
Morrison to prevent the jury from hearing the mandatory minimum penalty Ruiz 
faced if convicted. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Ruiz's conviction and 
sentence. 
DATED this loth day of June 2008. . 
.. 
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